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1
INTRODUCTION
Big Data and Big Analytics have become a big deal in today’s economy.1 They 1.01
are converting ordinary household items, like thermostats, into smart technologies. They are helping San Francisco commuters find parking spaces. They are
enabling a host of free items on the Internet, ranging from search engines to
apps that better track our health. They are yielding revolutionary innovations,
such as driverless cars, scores of Internet-enabled devices, and better analytics
for manufacturing.
Big Data and Big Analytics raise many legal, moral, and ethical issues, such as 1.02
cyber-security and the accountability of firms for their algorithms’ actions. Our
focus is on Big Data’s implications for competition policy. We are witnessing a competitive arms race for data (as opposed to more privacy)—the race to connect the
‘data’ bucket with the ‘money’ bucket by many tech firms and investors. Big Data is
playing a pivotal role in many companies’ strategic decision-making. More companies are adopting data-driven business models and strategies to obtain and sustain a
competitive ‘data-advantage’ over rivals. Data-driven mergers are increasing, as are
the risks of abuses of dominant tech firms. Data-driven exclusionary practices and
mergers raise significant implications for privacy, consumer protection, and competition law. But one problem, as the European Data Protection Supervisor observed
in 2014, is that competition authorities, until recently, have not fully considered the
implications of Big Data.
Our aim is to explore how competition law can play an integral role in ensuring that 1.03
we capture the benefits of a data-driven economy while mitigating its associated
1
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Data-Driven Innovation
for Growth and Well-being: Interim Synthesis Report, October 2014, p 7, http://w ww.oecd.org/sti/
inno/data-driven-innovation-interim-synthesis.pdf (observing how ‘[d]eclining costs along the
data value chain . . . have been a significant driver of the increasing generation and use of data, as well
as the accelerated migration of socioeconomic activities to the Internet thanks to the wide adoption
of e-services in an increasingly participative web. The resulting phenomenon—commonly referred
to as “big data”—signals the shift towards a data-driven economy, in which data enhance economic
competitiveness and drive innovation and equitable and sustainable development.’).
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Introduction
risks. To be clear, we do not argue that Big Data is invariably bad. Big Data is neither
inherently good, evil, nor neutral. Its social value depends on the industry and the
purpose and effect of the data-driven strategy. Our focus is to assess the implications of a data-driven economy on competition policy and identify instances when
privacy and competition concerns overlap. We will explore Big Data, its competitive implications, the competition authorities’ approach to data-driven mergers and
business strategies, and their current approach’s strengths and weaknesses.
1.04

This issue is important. In 2015, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) mistakenly released portions of a report by its Bureau of Competition staff regarding
the Google investigation.2 (Although Alphabet Inc in 2015 has replaced Google
Inc as the name of the publicly traded entity, we, for simplicity purposes, will refer
to the company as Google.) The legal staff recommended prosecuting Google. The
FTC instead opted to close its investigation after Google committed to change
some of its data-driven business practices.3 The FTC’s action was controversial.
Likewise, in 2015 when the European Commission’s competition authority issued

2
Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition, Report re Google Inc, 8 August 2012,
pp 94, 96, 98, 100, and 102 (‘FTC Staff Report’), http://graphics.wsj.com/google-f tc-report. A few
caveats about this report, which the FTC released (mistakenly) under the Freedom of Information
Act to the Wall Street Journal. First, only the Report’s even pages were released, so the missing odd
pages may have contained important qualifications. Second, other reports, including any prepared
by Google, were not released. Third, although the Competition Staff recommended that the FTC
file a complaint, the Commissioners elected not to. Google responded to the Report’s disclosure:
We understand that what was sent to the Wall Street Journal represents 50% of one
document written by 50% of the FTC case teams. Ultimately both case teams (100%)
concluded that no action was needed on search display and ranking. Speculation about
consumer or competitor harm turned out to be entirely wrong. On the other issues
raised, we quickly made changes as agreed with the FTC.
‘The FTC Report on Google’s Business Practices’, Wall Street Journal, 24 March 2015, http://graphics.
wsj.com/google-ftc-report/.
3
Federal Trade Commission, ‘Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC
Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and
in Online Search: Landmark Agreements Will Give Competitors Access to Standard-E ssential
Patents; Advertisers Will Get More Flexibility to Use Rival Search Engines’, Press Release,
3 January 2013, https://w ww.ftc.gov/news-e vents/press-releases/2013/01/google-a grees-change-
its-business-practices-resolve-f tc. After portions of the FTC Staff Report were disclosed and reports
of meetings between White House and Google officials, the FTC Chair and two Commissioners
responded, noting that the FTC conducted an ‘exhaustive’ investigation of Google’s Internet search
practices during 2011 and 2012:
Based on a comprehensive review of the voluminous record and extensive internal analysis, of which the inadvertently disclosed memo is only a fraction, all five Commissioners
(three Democrats and two Republicans) agreed that there was no legal basis for action
with respect to the main focus of the investigation—search. As we stated when the investigation was closed, the Commission concluded that Google’s search practices were
not, ‘on balance, demonstrably anticompetitive’.
Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, and Commissioners Julie Brill and
Maureen K. Ohlhausen Regarding the Google Investigation, 25 March 2015, https://w ww.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2015/03/statement-chairwoman-edith-ramirez-commissioners-julie-brill.
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Introduction
its statement of objections against Google, 4 some shouted protectionism (without
knowing the facts and evidentiary record that supported the Commission’s preliminary conclusion that Google degraded the quality of its search results by systematically favouring its own comparison shopping products in its general search
results page).
What is clear is that the European Commission’s statement of objections will not 1.05
end the matter. In 2015, the Commission stated that it was actively investigating
other activities by Google, including ‘whether Google has illegally hindered the
development and market access of rival mobile applications or services by requiring or incentivising smartphone and tablet manufacturers to exclusively pre-install
Google’s own applications or services’.5 In 2015, the FTC began investigating
whether Google, in favouring its products on Android, violated the antitrust laws.6
In 2016, Germany’s Bundeskartellamt initiated proceedings against Facebook on
suspicion of having abused its market power by infringing data protection rules. As
Andreas Mundt, President of the Bundeskartellamt, stated:
Dominant companies are subject to special obligations. These include the use of adequate terms of service as far as these are relevant to the market. For advertising-
financed internet services such as Facebook, user data are hugely important. For this
reason it is essential to also examine under the aspect of abuse of market power whether
the consumers are sufficiently informed about the type and extent of data collected.7

Competition authorities will invariably investigate other companies, whose business models are built on Big Data.
As more companies undertake data-driven business strategies and mergers, compe- 1.06
tition officials and courts will likely confront the competitive implications of Big
Data. They cannot ignore Big Data. The potential harm of data-driven mergers and
abuses of dominant companies built on data, as we will show, is too significant to
overlook or downplay. Some within the antitrust community are starting to appreciate the competitive benefits and risks of data-driven mergers and business strategies. Others, however, argue that competition law should have a limited role, if any,

4
European Commission, ‘Fact Sheet: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google
on Comparison Shopping Service’, 15 April 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
15- 4781_en.htm.
5
European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Investigation Against Google
in Relation to Android Mobile Operating System’, Press Release, 15 April 2015, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4782_en.htm.
6
David McLaughlin, ‘Google Said to Be Under US Antitrust Scrutiny Over Android’,
Bloomberg Business, 25 September 2015, http://w ww.bloomberg.com/news/a rticles/2015-09-25/
google-said-to-be-under-u-s-a ntitrust-scrutiny-over-a ndroid-iezf41sg.
7
Bundeskartellamt, ‘Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion of
having abused its market power by infringing data protection rules’, Press Release, 2 March 2016,
http://w ww.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_
2016_Facebook.html.
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in the era of Big Data. We disagree. One aim here is to move the debate beyond
these ten myths.

A. Myth 1: Privacy Laws Serve Different Goals
from Competition Law
1.07

Often, privacy concerns do not implicate competition concerns. A landlord, who
secretly records a tenant’s bedroom, violates the common law privacy tort, intrusion
upon seclusion. The landlord’s actions, however, do not violate competition law.

1.08

Likewise, some competition violations, like price-fi xing cartels, generally do not
raise privacy concerns. But data-driven business strategies, at times, will raise
both privacy and antitrust concerns. As we will explore, data-driven mergers, like
Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp, have the potential to lessen non-price competition in terms of the array of privacy protections offered to consumers. Likewise,
monopolies’ data-driven exclusionary practices can hamper innovative alternatives
that afford consumers greater privacy protection. Privacy competition—like other
facets of non-price competition—a lready exists in certain industries, but some
dominant companies do not face the competitive pressure to improve quality along
this dimension.

1.09

As the European Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager observed,
The more data you can collect, the more you know, the better product you can
provide, but also the more powerful will you be towards others. . . . It isn’t solely a
competition issue. . . . It’s very important for us to be able to say what is competition-
related and what is an issue of privacy, ownership, data, [and] how you can be as
secure on the net as you can be in the physical world.8

1.10

Thus one cannot quarantine privacy and competition concerns, unless one contorts
antitrust’s goals to a narrow economic objective that few others share.

B. Myth 2: The Tools that Competition Officials Currently
Use Fully Address All the Big Data Issues
1.11

The reality, as we address, is that many of the current analytical economic tools
do not address the Big Data issues. The competition authorities have better tools
to assess price effects. But they have far cruder tools to assess a merger’s effect on
non-price competition, including product quality and the degradation of privacy

8
MLex Interview: Margrethe Vestager, MLex Special Report, 22 January 2015 (‘Vestager Interview’),
http:// m lexmarketinsight.com/ w p-  c ontent/ u ploads/ 2 015/ 01/  M Lex-  I nterview- Vestager22-01-151.pdf.
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Myth 3: Market Forces Solve Privacy Issues
protection. The agencies can currently challenge the egregious case, ie, where the
evidence is compelling that the companies are competing along non-price dimensions, such as privacy protection, and the merger is intended to substantially lessen
this competition. But often the analysis of quality is less straightforward.9 This is
problematic with the growth of multi-sided markets, where the products offered
on one side are free. Quality, including privacy protection, will be an important
aspect of non-price competition. When the competition agencies solely focus on the
‘paid’ advertising side of these multi-sided markets, and ignore the merger’s impact
on the ‘free’ side, both consumers and advertisers are harmed. We will see this in
Chapter 15 with the merger wave of commercial radio stations in the US after the
1996 Telecommunications Act.

C. Myth 3: Market Forces Currently Solve Privacy Issues
The reality is that market forces are not solving privacy issues. Policymakers have 1.12
acknowledged that privacy’s notice-and-consent model is broken and ineffective.
In competitive markets, consumers should reign supreme. Nearly all Americans 1.13
(93 per cent) in a 2015 report believed that being in control of who can get information about them is important.10 But consumers do not reign supreme in many
data-driven industries. Most are frustrated, feeling they have lost control over their
personal data. Consumers are unaware of who has access to their personal information, what data is being used, how and when their data is being used, and the
privacy implications of the data’s use. ‘While Americans’ associations with the topic
of privacy are varied’, a 2014 survey by the Pew Research Center found, the majority
‘feel that their privacy is being challenged along such core dimensions as the security of their personal information and their ability to retain confidentiality’.11 In the
survey, 91 per cent ‘ “agree” or “strongly agree” that consumers have lost control over
how personal information is collected and used by companies’.12 Likewise, 72 per
cent of European Internet users ‘still worry that they are being asked for too much
personal data online’.13

9
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, ‘The Curious Case of Competition and Quality’,
3(2) J of Antitrust Enforcement (October 2015): pp 227–57, draft available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2494656.
10
Mary Madden and Lee Rainie, ‘Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and
Surveillance’, Pew Research Center, May 2015, http://
w ww.pewinternet.org/
fi les/
2015/
05/
Privacy-a nd-Security-Attitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf.
11
Pew Research Center, ‘Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden
Era’, 12 November 2014, http://w ww.pewinternet.org/fi les/2014/11/PI_ PublicPerceptionsof
Privacy_111214.pdf.
12
Ibid.
13
European Commission, Why We Need a Digital Single Market (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/fi les/digital_ single_market_factsheet_final_ 20150504.pdf.
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Introduction
1.14

Even when companies allow individuals to see (and perhaps edit or delete) information about them, the companies still will collect data on them and target
them with ads both online and offline.14 The market does not always provide
viable alternatives that protect our privacy. When alternatives emerge, many
often do not do very well. As the economist Joseph Farrell has pointed out,
consumer pessimism about online privacy may have contributed to the development of a ‘dysfunctional equilibrium’.15 Ordinarily, we would expect firms
and consumers to have aligned incentives, and the market would supply the
privacy protection consumers want. In a dysfunctional equilibrium, however,
the market underprovides privacy protection because consumers do not believe
that they have control over privacy or that companies really will protect their
privacy. A small firm cannot simply decide to break out of the equilibrium on
its own by adopting more privacy-protective policies and clearer disclosures.
Since consumer demand will not shift by much, the smaller firm will simply
sacrifice revenues.

1.15

Other reasons for the lack of privacy competition that we explore are the market’s high entry barriers due to several data-driven network effects and exclusionary behaviour by dominant firms. Moreover, some companies present themselves
as privacy enhancing when they play a dual role. One Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) article noted how there were few options for those wishing to
avoid being followed around on the web.16

1.16

Consequently, one cannot simply believe that market forces will always protect
consumers.

D. Myth 4: Data-Driven Online Industries
Are Not Subject to Network Effects
1.17

Some data-d riven industries are subject to network effects. Network effects,
as we discuss, are not always bad for consumers. Think of telephones, the
14
Amanda Hess, ‘Google Users Can Now Download Their Full Search Histories—and
Delete Their Archive’, Independent Online (UK), 7 May 2015, 2015 WLNR 13461451 (‘And
though Google is now inviting users to delete their search histories in a couple of clicks, it is
very unclear what that means: the company’s privacy policy still reserves the right to record your
search results, tie them to your IP address or Google account, then target ads on Google properties and beyond.’).
15
Joseph Farrell, ‘Can Privacy Be Just Another Good?’, 10 J on Telecomm & High Tech L
(2012): pp 251, 256–9.
16
Tom Simonite, ‘A Popular Ad Blocker Also Helps the Ad Industry: Millions of People Use the
Tool Ghostery to Block Online Tracking Technology—Some May Not Realize That it Feeds Data
to the Ad Industry’, MIT Technology Review, 17 June 2013, http://w ww.technologyreview.com/
news/516156/a-popular-ad-blocker-a lso-helps-t he-ad-industry/.
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Myth 5: Data-Driven Online Markets Have Low Entry Barriers
benefit of which increases as others use them. But network effects, at times,
enable big firms to become bigger until they dominate the industry. Data-
driven industries, as Chapters 11–14 explore, can be subject to several network effects:
•
•
•
•

Traditional network effects, including social networks such as Facebook;
Network effects involving the scale of data;
Network effects involving the scope of data; and
Network effects where the scale and scope of data on one side of the market affect
the other side of the market (such as advertising).

E. Myth 5: Data-Driven Online Markets
Have Low Entry Barriers
Entry barriers for data-d riven online industries are neither invariably low nor 1.18
high. Each industry can differ. Entry barriers, once low, can increase due to
network effects. One risk is that the economics of Big Data, as the OECD recently observed, ‘favours market concentration and dominance’.17 Data-d riven
markets ‘can lead to a “winner takes all” result where concentration is a likely
outcome of market success’.18
Moreover, the fact that venture funds are investing in online start-ups does not 1.19
mean entry barriers are necessarily low. Industries with high entry barriers can
still have entrants. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, for example, was unprepared to say that a competitor’s ‘entry and growth’ necessarily
foreclosed a finding that the defendant possessed monopoly power, especially
given defendant’s ‘overwhelming market share (90%), the large capital outlays
required to enter the domestic fittings market, and [defendant’s] undeniable
continued power over . . . prices’.19 Moreover, one has to examine in which particular markets the venture funds are investing. Few would likely fund a start-
up in the search market, given Google’s market share. In 2010 Microsoft tried,
and spent over ‘$4.5 billion into developing its algorithms and building the
physical capacity necessary to operate Bing’. 20 We will explore the uphill battle
Microsoft faced.

17
18
19
20

OECD, Data-Driven Innovation, above note 1, p 7.
Ibid.
McWane v Federal Trade Commission, 783 F3d 814, 832 (US Ct of Apps (11th Cir), 2015).
FTC Staff Report, above note 2, p 76.

7

Stucke_040216LAWUK.indb 7

5/17/2016 5:30:59 PM

8

Introduction

F. Myth 6: Data Has Little, If Any, Competitive
Significance, Since Data is Ubiquitous, Low Cost,
and Widely Available
1.20

Beware of those who say this. Some companies take the position that data are
like facts and argue that all data should be open. Mapping companies, for example, might believe that the data needed to develop a map should be accessible to
others. Other companies, however, treat their mapping data as proprietary and will
not share.

1.21

As we explore, data can be critical for a company’s growth and success. In one of
the mergers we analyse, Google’s acquisition of Waze, it was Waze’s inability to
achieve sufficient scale of data that hindered its competitive significance in mapping
services in the United Kingdom.21 Thus, companies currently spend considerable
money and effort to acquire and analyse personal data and to maintain a data-related
competitive advantage. If any company propagates this myth, ask it if it would be
willing to license its consumer data to its competitors, and if so, at what price.

G. Myth 7: Data Has Little, If Any, Competitive
Significance, as Dominant Firms Cannot Exclude Smaller
Companies’ Access to Key Data or Use Data to Gain a
Competitive Advantage
1.22

As Chapter 18 discusses, unlike Microsoft in the 1990s, today’s dominant firms can
use the velocity of data to discern trends well before others. In monitoring search
queries, Google, for example, can predict flu outbreaks well before the government
health agencies can. Some dominant platforms through similar nowcasting (such
as watching for trends in their proprietary data of consumer behaviour while browsing the web and offline) can now monitor emerging business models in real time.
In assessing these trends, dominant firms can quickly identify (and squelch) nascent competitive threats. The dominant firms can acquire these still small firms
before they become significant competitive threats or use other means to blunt their
growth.

1.23

Thus, in today’s world, the dominant firms that have a significant data-advantage
over rivals may enjoy a unique radar system that can track the flight path of competitive threats shortly after they take off from distant fields. The monopoly can

21
Office of Fair Trading, Completed Acquisition by Motorola Mobility (Google, Inc) of Waze
Mobile Ltd, ME/6167/13, 17 December 2013.

8

Stucke_040216LAWUK.indb 8

5/17/2016 5:30:59 PM

9

Myth 9: Consumers Generally Benefit from Free Goods and Services
intercept or shoot down the threats long before they become visible to regulators
and others.

H. Myth 8: Competition Officials Should Not
Concern Themselves with Data-Driven Industries
because Competition Always Comes
from Surprising Sources
In the long run, monopolists, like the rest of us, die. But consumers should not 1.24
suffer the harm from anticompetitive mergers and monopolistic abuses, because
eventually a disruptive innovator will emerge.
As Chapters 15, 16, and 18 discuss, the harm from anticompetitive data-driven 1.25
mergers and abuses by dominant firms can be significant. The harm not only involves higher advertising rates. The abuses of powerful tech firms can cause greater
harm in the loss of choice, innovation, privacy, individual autonomy and freedom,
and citizens’ trust in a market economy. The issue of ‘data justice’ is gaining traction especially as an inequality issue, as companies use data to exploit society’s more
vulnerable members, thus furthering the income divide.22 The harm, the OECD
recognized, can strike ‘the core values of democratic market economies and the
well-being of all citizens’.23

I. Myth 9: Competition Officials Should Not Concern
Themselves with Data-Driven Industries Because
Consumers Generally Benefit from Free Goods and Services
Consumers do not invariably benefit when services are ‘free’, because these services 1.26
are not actually free. Consumers pay with their personal data and privacy. Because
of the lack of transparency, consumers often do not know how much they actually
pay for these services. In fact, economist Carl Shapiro, in a 2015 workshop, criticized the notion that because something is ‘free’, it must be good for consumers.
Prices can be positive, zero, or negative (where consumers are subsidized).24
In a January 2015 interview, Commissioner Vestager discussed the linkages among 1.27
data, privacy, and competition: ‘Very few people realize that, if you tick the box,
your information can be exchanged with others. . . . Actually, you are paying a price,

See generally http://datajustice.org.
OECD, Data-Driven Innovation, above note 1, p 7.
24
Daniel Donegan, ‘Summary of Committee Program on Antitrust and Zero Price Products’,
The Price Point, Newsletter of the ABA Antitrust Pricing Conduct Committee, Winter 2015, p 16.
22
23
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an extra price for the product that you are purchasing. You give away something
that was valuable. I think that point is underestimated as a factor as to how competition works’.25 Vestager made a similar point during her confirmation hearings
before the European Parliament, where she described data as ‘the new currency of
the Internet’.26

J. Myth 10: Consumers Who Use these Free Goods
and Services Do Not Have Any Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
1.28

Granted some people share a lot of personal details online. But generally we can
infer consumers’ privacy preferences from their choices when
• consumers are fully informed about their choice’s benefits and costs (including
privacy risks), and
• the marketplace offers a competitive array of options that match actual privacy
preferences.
As we discuss, that often is not the case today.

1.29

The issues we explore are timely. Until early 2015, the European and US competition authorities, which were supposed to screen mergers to prevent those
likely to be anticompetitive, largely did not consider the implications of a data-
driven economy on competition policy. There are some exceptions, as we discuss. But that is rapidly changing, with the Europeans taking the lead. The
European Commission in 2015 launched an antitrust competition inquiry into
the e-c ommerce sector in the EU. The inquiry, according to the Commission
press release, ‘will allow the Commission to identify possible competition concerns affecting European e-c ommerce markets’. 27 A final report of the sector
inquiry is expected in 2017. Also in 2015, the European Commission adopted
its ‘Digital Single Market Strategy’, which is built on three pillars: ‘(1) better
access for consumers and businesses to digital goods and services across Europe;
(2) creating the right conditions and a level playing field for digital networks
and innovative services to flourish; (3) maximising the growth potential of the
digital economy’. 28

Vestager Interview, above note 8.
James Kanter, ‘Antitrust Nominee in Europe Promises Scrutiny of Big Tech Companies’,
New York Times, 3 October 2014.
27
European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Launches e-commerce Sector Inquiry’, Press
Release, 6 May 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4921_en.htm.
28
European Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market for Europe: Commission Sets Out 16
Initiatives to Make It Happen’, Press Release, 6 May 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
IP-15- 4919_en.htm.
25

26
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Myth 10: Consumers Do Not Have Any Expectations of Privacy
The implications of Big Data on competition policy will likely be part of the mix. 1.30
The Commission, for example, will ‘comprehensively analyse the role of online platforms (search engines, social media, app stores, etc.) in the market’, and examine
‘the non-transparency of search results and of pricing policies, how they use the
information they acquire, relationships between platforms and suppliers and the
promotion of their own services to the disadvantage of competitors—to the extent
these are not already covered by competition law’.29
Other competition officials, however, are more closed-minded. Some believe that 1.31
privacy has little, if anything, to do with competition policy. Others believe that
they have the right tools, know the proper questions, and simply must wait for the
right case to present itself. This worldview, to put it bluntly, is misguided. Our
purpose here is to show why the competition authorities’ current toolkit for analysing many data-driven mergers and business strategies is outdated. The competition
agencies, through 2015, have played a minor role in protecting consumers from the
anticompetitive risks of a data-driven economy. Nor, as we discuss, can competition agencies simply push the issue to another agency. Privacy officials, with their
behavioural remedies, cannot pick up the slack. Competition policy plays a key role
in ensuring that citizens get the benefits of a data-driven economy, and in minimizing its risks.
Our book is divided into five parts. Part I outlines the four ‘V’s—volume, velocity, 1.32
variety, and value—of Big Data, and their competitive significance. We also examine why market forces have not provided consumers with better mechanisms to
protect their privacy interests. Part II looks at how the competition authorities assess
data-driven mergers and the issues they identified (and missed). Part III explains
some of the challenges that Big Data currently present to the conventional antitrust
wisdom. Given these challenges, some argue for a limited role, if any, for competition policy in data-driven markets. Part IV identifies several risks if competition
authorities ignore or downplay data-driven mergers and the abuses by dominant
tech firms. As the current analytical tools are at best average, and at worst useless,
in assessing certain data-driven strategies, Part V advances a research agenda for
the competition agencies and scholars to better understand the implications of a
data-driven economy.

29

Ibid.
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